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Malik: If the basic claim of Speculative Realism (SR) across its several fronts is that
what lies beyond human cognition can be apprehended in its alien status—
that thought can think beyond itself, as Quentin Meillassoux has put it1—this
is correctly understood as a vigorous challenge to the poststructuralist and
post-Marxist orthodoxies of contemporary art and its prevalent theoretical
armature. In their divergent ways, these orthodoxies propose that the real is
necessarily shaped by discourse, social structure, economy, desire, subject-
hood, the material or psychic structures of thought, and so on. Here, the real
is not alien to discourse and anthropological praxes but rather, so to speak,
inalienable from them.
Given the evident incongruity and even incompatibility between SR
and poststructuralism, what has been perplexing is how and why some
strands of SR, primarily object-oriented ontology, have been assimilated to
developments of poststructuralism from the mid-2000s, particularly material-
ist feminism, affect theory, some queer theory, and performativity theory.
These theories certainly share with SR an interest in breaking up the central-
ity of the human actor and extending the world of relationality beyond its
historically privileged agents (from all kinds of subjects to objects); but their
other basic commitments are wholly incompatible with SR. It’s this confused
hybrid of theoretical stances that the word “neo-materialism” now predomi-
nantly signifies in contemporary art, defanging and, worse yet, expropriating
SR’s most challenging demands on the orthodoxies of both contemporary
art and theoretical-academic hegemons.
Cox: Exactly. A rigorous materialism would, as Nietzsche put it, “translate humanity
back into nature.”2 But much of what is called neo-materialism today does
just the opposite: it humanizes nature. The formerly inert and lifeless is treated
as animate, as an “actant” with an “agency” no less “vibrant” than our own.
Even deep time—in which human existence is but a fleeting microsecond—
is examined in the humanities and arts today primarily under the banner of
“the Anthropocene”!
Materialism should reject these new avatars of correlationism in which
the world is seen only in our image. This means refusing the divisions
between nature/culture and matter/mind by which we persuaded ourselves
that we were higher and better than the rest of matter; and it means natural-
izing reason, mind, culture, and language, treating them not as anomalous
or miraculous endowments but as variants of processes discernible in the rest
of the natural world.
Malik: On this, we disagree, in part. We agree in rejecting the exteriority of human
1. See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 36.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), §230, p. 123.
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sapience to natural processes—a Ptomelaic hangover that has to be
renounced. But we shouldn’t attribute apprehension of the real to natural
processes themselves, espousing a sort of Deleuzian vitalism that’s close to the
hegemonic variants of neo-materialism (HNM) identified above that confound
SR’s interest in identifying what is irreducibly alien to thought or discourse (or
some proxy of these) with the poststructuralist vitiation of this possibility (even
via the limit case of the altering encounter with the Other). . . 
Cox: I don’t think there’s anything vitalist about the radical materialism I’m
espousing. It naturalizes the human rather than humanizing nature. Reason
is not other than nature; and to treat it as such—as, I think, neo-rationalist
critics of materialism do3—is theological insofar as it posits a transcendent
world of reason and culture that’s irreducible to the rest of nature.
Malik: This is our point of contention. Yes, the theological hangover has to be dis-
carded in all its varieties: reason is not a proto-miracle nor is it ordained by
grace. But, theoretically, the issue is whether what happens on the two sides
of the phase shift that is the anthropotechnical nexus are only contiguous. A
demarcation is definitionally inaugurated with that phase shift, meaning that
the effects cannot be described in the terms available before it. Furthermore,
as technoscience demonstrates, the before of nature is itself recursively modi-
fied by the after of anthropotechnical intervention, which involves the use of
reason. That is, nature is now itself anthropogenetically or quasi-rationally
constituted—or can be—by technosciences that are fundamentally construc-
tive. This is not only what matter can be, but how it must now be understood.
What is materialism then? 
Cox: Doesn’t this revert back to the humanism and correlationism I thought we
both repudiated, treating nature and the facts uncovered by science as inex-
tricably bound to the human and to human history? I think you also overesti-
mate the place of our species in the natural world and in cosmic history.
From Copernicus and Galileo to Hutton, Darwin, and current neuroscience,
all the scientific breakthroughs of modernity have pushed in the opposite
direction, undermining human narcissism and megalomania.
Malik: Recognizing anthropogenetic interventions and constructions of nature
and matter does not mean that we are exporting our image of ourselves into
them. As we regularly learn, interventions on nature do not necessarily lead
to vain images of ourselves. An embryo with the DNA of three “parents” does
not reproduce an image of human or animal life but is an invention—in and
of nature as well as our self-image. Rational-material invention thinks outside
3. See, for example, “Reason Is Inconsolable and Non-Conciliatory: Ray Brassier in
Conversation with Suhail Malik,” in Realism Materialism Art, ed. Christoph Cox, Jenny Jaskey, and Suhail
Malik (Berlin: Sternberg, 2015), pp. 219–20; and Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 2–3, 22–35.
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thought itself because it recognizes what matter might be in terms that had
not yet been thought. Art of course has the capacity to take its role in this,
and is maybe even a privileged historical name for this ambition. But neoma-
terialism in thrall to contemporary art—HNM—cannot. 
The claim that this rational determination of materialism is a “theologi-
cal” or correlational determination of matter is itself a theoretically stipulated
subordination of reason to natural processes. As with HNM, but distinct to it, it
promulgates a negatively governed materialism. Both proscribe commencing
from matter’s rationalizable construction. Granted, that postulate is probably
not just a materialism—but, given that we agree to dispense with HNM, how is
the demand here to be met by the naturalized materialism you endorse? 
Cox: Again, it’s deeply narcissistic of us to think that human invention and interven-
tion marks some fundamental “phase shift” in the history of the universe.
Natural history is full of such material transformations prior to, and surely fol-
lowing, the existence of human beings: the emergence of life itself, mass extinc-
tions triggered by asteroids, biological mutation, etc. Human reason and
anthropotechnics is absolutely continuous with this natural history, which, in
the not too distant future, will bury all trace of the human in its eternal course.
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